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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MASS](#) [IZ](#) [RU](#) [TU](#)
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE WASHINGTON VISIT OF TURKISH
NAVAL FORCES CHIEF ADMIRAL METIN ATAC

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Anthony Godfrey, reasons 1.
4 (b and d)

¶1. (C) Admiral Atac's visit will permit us to further cement strong bilateral military ties through the service with which we have perhaps the strongest bond. This visit will allow Atac to raise the most pressing issues for the Turkish Navy today:

- U.S. naval presence in the Black Sea in response to a new test to stability and security in the Caucasus
- Improvement of Turkish capabilities
- Renewed Aegean Dispute over Noble Archer

¶2. (C) CJCS Admiral Mullen's September visit to Turkey was the first foreign counterpart visit accepted by the new CHOD GEN Basbug and served well to reconfirm the strong bilateral cooperation we have enjoyed since the President's November 2007 decision to increase anti-PKK intelligence sharing. On October 24, Gen Odierno visited Turkey and met with DCHOD General Hasan Igsiz to further develop this relationship; VCJCS General Cartwright's upcoming visit to Turkey and meeting with General Igsiz planned for November 15 will further strengthen the critical bond with the new leadership at the Turkish General Staff (TGS).

¶3. (C) Domestically, relations between a staunchly secular military and a mildly Islamist government seem at least adequate, with the government defending the military leadership in the aftermath of the attack against an isolated outpost on the border with Iraq in early October. As we prepare for annual High Level Defense Group planned for December 4-5 in Ankara to frame US-Turkish military relations in 2009 and beyond, talks with Atac can help convey a sense of our strategy, reassure Ankara of a continuity in senior-level USG interest and understanding, and enlist help where we need it.

Strong Military Relations

¶4. (C) At his August 28 change of command ceremony, incoming CHOD GEN Basbug described intelligence sharing arrangements with the U.S. targeting the terrorist PKK as "perfect." He said that one of his most important responsibilities is to ensure that U.S.-Turkish cooperation continues. Basbug has observed that military force alone cannot defeat terrorism; economic, social, diplomatic and other means are needed. To back this up, he visited the southeast in his first week as CHOD and studiously listened to Kurdish NGO leaders on the complexities of politics, economics and terrorism.

¶5. (S) Real-time intelligence provided to TGS through our Combined Intelligence Fusion Cell has fueled almost 150 cross-border strikes against the PKK in northern Iraq since November 2007. Basbug has suggested that the PKK may be near the breaking point and that this winter may be decisive. However, fighting and attacks within Turkey in recent weeks has risen in the southeast, Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin and elsewhere. If the usual PKK flow back to northern Iraq occurs before winter and/or if large-scale PKK attacks within Turkey occur, pressure for a land operation will rise, but it is just as likely that air, artillery and possibly Special Forces strikes will remain the tools of choice.

Black Sea

¶6. (S) Events in Georgia reminded Turks they are on NATO's front line in the Caucasus against Russia, on which they depend for 3/4 of their natural gas. Turkey is deeply concerned about the prospects for more instability or revived East-West confrontation, does not see a strategic approach from the West, and will not want to be tougher with Russia than others. Despite misgivings, Turkey has approved all our ship transit requests and has rebuffed Moscow's complaints it was bending Montreux to suit us. Since Georgia, Turkish authorities have not reprised their complaints about U.S. aims in the Black Sea, but they do not want problems.

¶7. (S) The Turks have highlighted their commitment to working with the U.S. and NATO in support of Georgia, reaffirmed their support for Georgia's territorial integrity, promoted their Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and asked about our plans. You can reassure Atac that we will continue to work within Montreux and that despite our increased naval presence in the Black Sea, we are not seeking confrontation with Russia. Atac will likely acknowledge the new level of NAVEUR presence in the Black Sea, will recognize the necessity of this presence, but will ask that the U.S. "take a breather" between Black Sea operations and allow a brief period between vessel transits.

Security Cooperation

¶8. (C) During the conduct of anti-PKK operations, our ODC identified multiple Turkish capability gaps with respect to command and control, intelligence collection, and close air support. In rapid fashion, the ODC aggressively developed multiple programs (manned ISR platform, offers for attack helicopters, development of a Predator capability) to address these capability gaps -- only to watch the civilian procurement process here gum things up and our efforts languish. Longer-term, we have promoted the idea of a forward looking security cooperation plan with the Turks. Its target: developing the allied military capabilities Turkey needs to face upcoming challenges to NATO and bilaterally (counterterrorism, counter WMD, energy security, etc.) in ways that ensure interoperability and compatibility with US and NATO systems. Mention of this to Atac will help get Turkish buy-in ahead of the HLDG, which can, we hope, be elevated from gripes about slow licensing and third-party transfer restrictions to a more appropriately strategic cooperation.

Noble Archer

¶9. (C) Atac will likely raise this Greek exercise planned for December requiring overflight of Agios Efstratios, an Aegean island Turkey considers demilitarized. SACEUR has agreed to make NATO assets available to the Greeks. If the exercise proceeds as planned, we anticipate a strong Turkish reaction which might undermine some high priority issues on our bilateral agenda with Turkey.

Cooperation Programs

¶10. (C) INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE (ISR). Turkish military has expressed interest in acquiring armed Predator UAVs. Turkish military and acquisition personnel are in Israel until at least 3 November 2008, presumably to take delivery of some of the Heron UAVs previously purchased.

¶11. (C) AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS. On 17 Dec 2007, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) submitted A Request for Price and Availability (P&A) for 12 Patriot fire units and a mixture of GEM-T and PAC 3 missiles. A large contingent of Turkish officials from SSM, Turkish Air Force and TGS visited a Raytheon Patriot system production facility in Andover, Massachusetts, the Lockheed PAC-3 missile assembly plant in Camden, Arkansas and Ft Bliss, Texas, home of several Patriot units and the schoolhouse. The trip was very informative and the Turkish delegation had all major agenda items answered. The delegation was able to discuss Patriot issues with five current and former battery commanders all of whom had confirmed tactical ballistic missile (TBM) kills during Desert Storm and OIF. On 22 July, Raytheon personnel briefed SSM on their plan to provide Turkey with an integrated air defense system with options for significant Turkish industrial participation primarily with Aselsan and Roketsan. The deal includes workshare and offsets that will provide Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC) with up to 9 HAWK XXI fire units for medium range and 144 AIM 9X missiles for short range protection. A decision on which system Turkey will purchase is expected by the end of 2008.

¶12. (C) NAVIGATION AND TARGETING PODS. SSM submitted a LOR for LOA on 11 July 2008 for 30 Sniper and 30 LANTIRN ER pods. On 26 Sep 2008 the package had passed Congressional notification and was forwarded to Air Force Security Assistance Command to write the Letter of Request for Offer and Acceptance (LOR for LOA).

¶13. (C) HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTERS. Boeing met with SSM, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and ASELSAN on 4-5 June ¶2008. SSM reviewed the plan for the CH-47s as a standard exportable model with 4 Turkish unique requirements provided via FMS. TAI, ASELSAN and Boeing would develop, design, test and integrate nine remaining unique configuration items via a commercial sale after delivery. SSM directed Boeing to conduct technical meetings with TAI, ASELSAN and PM Cargo in the U.S. from 23-27 June in order to define Statement of Work (SOW), work share, cost and scheduling required to complete all 14 non-standard modifications. SSM notified Boeing that USG restrictions concerning release of the Chinook software source code may cause the Turkish Government to reconsider the program. Boeing continues to work with SSM and Turkish industry to reach agreement on ground rules and work sharing arrangements to serve as a basis for Boeing's ROM estimate for the post-FMS commercial program in Turkey. The new proposed date for the demonstration is 19-23 January 2009.

¶14. (C) MK-54 LIGHTWEIGHT HYBRID TORPEDO. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) signed a FMS case to purchase 100 MK-54 torpedoes and associated support in August 2007, making Turkey the first foreign purchaser of this air and surface launched weapon.

¶15. (C) MK-48 ADVANCED CAPABILITY (ADCAP) HEAVYWEIGHT TORPEDO. MND requested Pricing & Availability (P&A) information for this submarine launched torpedo in January ¶2008. The Turkish Navy is considering the purchase of between 30 and 60 of these torpedoes for their new Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarine project. A team with representatives from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and others visited Ankara on 20 August 2008 to discuss weapon integration solutions to a Turkish Navy designed and built combat management system. Naval Undersea Warfare Center is working with LM and Raytheon to develop Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) cost for the integration effort. Turkey

decided in July 2008 to start contract negotiations with Germany's HDW and Marine Force International (HDW/MFI) joint partnership group for the acquisition of six AIP submarines to be built at Turkey's Glck naval shipyard.

¶16. (C) HARPOON BLOCK II MISSILES. On 1 October 2007, Turkey signed a FMS case for 25 missiles and parts/technical support. This significant upgrade to the Harpoon missile will give the Turkish Navy a limited land attack capability. The Turkish navy will have initial operational capability in the Fall of 2009.

¶17. (C) MK-41 VERTICAL LAUNCH SYSTEM (VLS). Turkish Navy purchased four additional Vertical Launch System (VLS) launchers and upgraded Air Warfare systems for GABYA (EX-OLIVER HAZARD PERRY) Class Frigates in November, 2007.

¶18. (C) AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL (AEW&C) AIRCRAFT. Production of four AEW&C aircraft began in late 2004, and Boeing delivered the first sterile aircraft to TUSAS Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) on 13 March 2006. TAI is currently modifying the remaining three AEW&C Peace Eagle aircraft at its facility in Turkey. During 4-8 February 2008 Peace Eagle System 1 flew its first flight with mission systems up and running. Due to the continuing dispute over liquidated damages over the 3 year delay of the program the last program review was postponed until this issue is resolved. In late August 2008, a team from Boeing provided SSM and Turkish Air Force Boeing's best offer to attempt to resolve the situation. Boeing believes penalties are not due given the late and deficient Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) ESM subsystem, which is as late as the rest of the system, and the contract allows for a day-to-day slide for the program's delay. Nonetheless, Boeing feels they made a very generous offer including cash, providing a second SATCOM at no cost, a spare engine, a list of enhanced capabilities for Turkish Air Force, and a willingness to absorb the impact of the late GFE. Boeing hopes SSM/Turkish Air Force will accept their offer to resolve the issue and allow all sides to positively move forward to complete the system, enter qualification testing early in 2009 and commence deliveries the following year.

¶19. (C) ATTACK HELICOPTERS. Turkey and Italy launched a project in June 2008 for the joint manufacture of up to 91 attack helicopters, worth approximately \$3 billion. Italy's

AGUSTAWESTLAND will provide the engine and flight control/monitoring systems. The Helo will be based on AGUSTAWESTLAND'S A129 Model, and the first delivery is expected in five years.

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WILSON